PUBLIC CONCERN AND OUTRAGEOUS SPEECH:
TESTING THE INCONSTANT BOUNDARIES OF IIED AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT THREE YEARS AFTER SNYDER V.
PHELPS
Clay Calvert∗
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes how the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Westboro Baptist Church
funeral-protest case of Snyder v. Phelps is now affecting lawsuits brought against media
defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The pro-First Amendment result
three years ago in Snyder pivoted largely on the Court’s expansive definition of “public concern.”
Using a quartet of post-Snyder cases as analytical springboards, the article examines how Snyder
and the concept of public concern are being deployed by both courts and media defense attorneys in
IIED cases premised upon the publication of allegedly outrageous speech. Ultimately, none of the
judges in the post-Snyder cases studied here heeded Chief Justice John Roberts’ statement that
Snyder should be viewed narrowly. Instead, the notion of public concern was broadly stretched far
beyond the factual confines of Snyder. In only one case, in fact, did a Snyder-based, publicconcern defense not win the day.

INTRODUCTION
This Article examines how the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 deci1
sion in Snyder v. Phelps, with its heavy emphasis on safeguarding
2
speech about matters of public concern, is now affecting lawsuits for
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131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
See id. at 1215–16 (reasoning that the “case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern,” emphasizing that speech about matters of public concern is “‘at
the heart of the First Amendment’s’” guarantee of free expression, noting that “restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns
as limiting speech on matters of public interest[,]” and identifying three factors—the
content, form, and context of speech—for courts to consider in deciding if speech is
about a matter of public or private concern (internal citations omitted)). It has been observed that the Snyder court’s distinction between matters of public and private concern
“proved crucial” in the case. James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 495 (2011); see also Aaron H. Caplan, Free
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intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)3 and outrage4 filed
5
against media defendants. Citing First Amendment concerns about
free expression, the Court in Snyder appeared to substantially cabin
6
and confine the viability of IIED in private-figure plaintiff cases pivot7
ing on speech addressing matters of public concern. Professor Nat
Stern observed, for example, that the Court’s conclusion that the
speech “amounted to commentary on matters of public concern
8
proved central to its ruling that the speech was protected.”
As for the projected impact of Snyder’s public-concern-centric focus on the future of the IIED tort, Professor Elizabeth Jaffe asserted,
the same year of the decision, that Snyder renders IIED “all but obso9
10
lete” in such situations. University of Florida Professor Lyrissa Lid-
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6

7
8
9

10

Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 823 (2013) (noting that the court
in Snyder “emphasized that Westboro’s speech related to topics of public concern”).
IIED typically “consists of four elements: (1) the defendant’s conduct must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable, (3) the defendant’s
conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the distress must be severe.”
Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause of Action
Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000); see, e.g., Harris v. Kreutzer, 624 S.E.
2d 24, 33 (Va. 2006) (noting that, in Virginia, IIED “requires four elements to be proved:
(1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was outrageous
and intolerable; (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and
the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe”).
See Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d 40, 52 (Ala. 2012) (remarking that “[t]he intentional infliction of emotional distress is also known as the tort of outrage”).
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly
ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties, rendering them applicable to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (establishing freedom of speech
and freedom of the press as “fundamental personal rights . . . protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).
See Michael I. Krauss, A Marine’s Honor: The Supreme Court from Snyder to Alvarez, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (noting that “the plaintiff in Snyder was a private citizen”); Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 DUKE L.J.
1109, 1168 (2013) (characterizing Snyder as “a case involving a private citizen using private law to seek redress against a group of people who sought to hijack his son’s funeral
for their own purposes”).
See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 (concluding “that the First Amendment bars [plaintiff Albert] Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress”).
Nat Stern, Secondary Speech and the Protective Approach to Interpretive Dualities in the Roberts
Court, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 142 (2013).
Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones but Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
Will Never Hurt Me: The Demise of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in the Aftermath of Snyder v. Phelps, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 473, 475 (2011).
Other scholars are in accord with Jaffe’s view. See, e.g., Joseph Russomanno, “Freedom for
the Thought that We Hate”: Why Westboro Had to Win, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 133, 171 (2012)
(“After Snyder, intentional infliction of emotional distress is weaker—and perhaps disa-
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sky, in turn, predicted one year later that Snyder was “likely to be an
unmitigated boon to media defendants litigating tort cases in years to
11
come.”
Why might such early prognostications ultimately prove to be
true? Because, as Professor Mark Tushnet recently wrote, Snyder can
be interpreted as adopting “a rule that a victim cannot recover for a
speaker’s intentional infliction of emotional distress if the vehicle for
12
inflicting that distress is a comment on a matter of public concern.”
He is not the only academic to subscribe to this view. Professor Eugene Volokh concurs, asserting that Snyder held that IIED “may not
be used to impose liability based on the distress caused by the content
13
of speech on matters of public concern.” More generally and broadly, Snyder reaffirmed the First Amendment principle, as Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky notes, that “speech cannot be punished, or speakers
held liable, just because the speech is offensive, even deeply offen14
sive.”
Now, three years after Snyder, this Article examines how the case is
affecting the dialectic in media-defendant cases between, on the one
hand, constitutional concerns with protecting speech regarding matters of public concern and, on the other hand, tort interests in compensating individuals for severe emotional distress caused by the “ex15
16
treme and outrageous” speech upon which the “parasitic tort” of

11
12
13
14

15

16

bled—in claims stemming from speech. First Amendment protection is now stronger.
The circumstances under which an intentional infliction claim could prevail have narrowed.”).
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1825 (2012) (citation omitted).
Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 109 (2012).
Eugene Volokh, The Trouble With “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97
VA. L. REV. 567, 585 (2011).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 724 (2011); see Lidsky,
supra note 11, at 1821–22 (observing that Snyder, along with the Court’s ruling in the images-of-animal-cruelty case of United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010), “affirm[s]
that the government may not suppress distasteful speech, even when most citizens find it
morally reprehensible and it offers little social value”).
See, e.g., Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that, under the first element of IIED, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the defendant’s conduct
was truly extreme and outrageous”); Hunt v. Delaware, 69 A.3d 360, 367 (Del. 2013) (noting that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant “engaged in extreme or outrageous
conduct”); Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ohio 1994) (noting that a
plaintiff suing for IIED must prove “that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous”).
See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy: Promissory Estoppel and Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 904 (2009) (describing IIED as “a parasitic tort with more academic hullabaloo than real-world success” (quoting Patricia
Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J.
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IIED pivots. Much important scholarly ink has been expended in recent years considering the meaning of public concern and its close
17
cousin, newsworthiness, within the context of privacy and, specifical18
ly, the tort of public disclosure of private facts. This Article, instead,
starts to break new ground by concentrating on the meaning of public concern within the context of IIED and, in particular, IIED claims
based upon the publication of allegedly outrageous speech by media
defendants that were resolved after Snyder.
Initially, Part I provides a primer on Snyder, as well as both the Su19
preme Court’s 1988 ruling in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell and the
critical IIED element demanding proof that a defendant engaged in
20
extreme and outrageous conduct or speech. Part II then analyzes
and critiques four post-Snyder cases involving IIED claims filed against
media defendants and premised upon the publication of allegedly
21
outrageous speech. Specifically, Part II investigates how notions of
public concern and/or outrageous speech in this quartet of disputes
played out in comparison to, and against the backdrop of, Snyder.
Returning to address in greater detail the most recent of the four
cases analyzed in Part II—namely, Rodriguez v. Fox News Network,
22
23
24
LLC, which now is on appeal—the Article in Parts III and IV ex-

17

18

19
20
21
22

TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 81 (2007))); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense Against Outrage and the Perils of Parasitic Torts, 45 GA. L. REV. 107, 115–16 (2010) (“In practice, if not
in doctrine, IIED continues to be a parasitic tort, one that is pled and alleged in circumstances where other, better-established tort or contract claims could also have been put
forward.”).
See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 515, 580–81 (2007) (“A newsworthiness standard . . . involves essentially the same
inquiry as a ‘public concern’ test. A newsworthiness inquiry is common in the context of
privacy tort actions.”).
See, e.g., Patricia Sanchez Abril, “A Simple, Human Measure of Privacy”: Public Disclosure of
Private Facts in the World of Tiger Woods, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 385, 385–86 (2011) (discussing “the applicability of the public disclosure tort” and appealing “for reinvigorated
privacy protection for those who shield their private lives”); Samantha Barbas, The Death of
the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 172 (2010)
(noting scholars generally regard the tort of public disclosure of private facts as dead);
Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (2009) (noting that “tort law provides remedies against even
accurate reporting when it invades personal privacy”); Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and
Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 781 (2009) (endeavoring to “compare[] and
contrast[] the ethical obligations of news reporters under journalism ethics codes with
their reporting obligations under state defamation and privacy tort laws”).
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
See infra notes 26–76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 77–209 and accompanying text.
Minute Entry, Rodriguez v. Fox News Network LLC, No. CV2013-008467 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
Jan.
30,
2014)
[hereinafter
Rodriguez
Minute
Entry],
available
at
http://www.medialaw.org/images/medialawdaily/rodriguezminute.pdf.
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plores how increasing judicial and legislative sensitivity to the emotional impact of images of death on relatives, along with news media
awareness that coverage of car chases could very well end with the
capture of such death images, might affect IIED cases akin to Rodriguez in the future. Finally, this Article concludes by asserting that the
cases evaluated here largely demonstrate the elasticity of the public
concern concept in IIED cases after Snyder and, in turn, lower courts’
seeming unwillingness to confine the holding in Snyder to its unique
25
set of facts. With the exception of one decision, the cases represent
clear First Amendment victories for media defendants, much as many
predicted would be the situation after Snyder. Importantly, the conclusion of this Article also considers several ways in which Snyder
might be limited in the future and it rejects one such method as constitutionally unsound.
I. SNYDER V. PHELPS, MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN AND EXTREME AND
OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT: A PRIMER
Snyder v. Phelps26 centered on speech by seven members of the
27
Westboro Baptist Church (“WBC”). They were standing on public
property about 1,000 feet away from a church where a funeral was being held for Matthew Snyder, a soldier killed in the line of duty in
28
Iraq. Believing “that the United States is overly tolerant of sin and
29
that God kills American soldiers as punishment[,]” the WBC members held signs with messages such as “Thank God for IEDs,” “God
30
Hates Fags,” and “Pope in Hell[.]” They displayed them “for about
30 minutes before the funeral began and sang hymns and recited Bi31
ble verses.”
Albert Snyder, the deceased soldier’s father, sued for IIED, among
32
other causes of action. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme
Court, Chief Justice John Roberts observed for the eight-Justice majority that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment “can serve
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

See infra notes 210–38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 239–52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 253–77 and accompanying text.
131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (2011) (noting that Albert Snyder “alleged five
state tort law claims: defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.”).
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as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction
33
of emotional distress.” Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that any liability for IIED in Snyder hinged “largely on whether [the WBC’s]
34
speech is of public or private concern,” with speech regarding matters of public concern being privileged and “at the heart of the First
35
Amendment’s protection.”
In explicating public concern, the Snyder majority focused on
36
three variables—content, context, and form of the speech —and
wrote that when considering them, “no factor is dispositive, and it is
necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including
37
what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.” In addition to
articulating this trio of variables, the Court broadly defined public
concern as expression that might “be fairly considered as relating to
38
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community”
or that relates to “a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a sub39
ject of general interest and of value and concern to the public[.]”
40
This disjunctive, two-part test (the Court used “or” rather than “and”
to separate the prongs) has been criticized as “riddled with ambigui41
ties that lower courts must now sort through.”
In Snyder, however, the majority had little problem in finding the
WBC’s speech related to matters of public concern. Chief Justice
Roberts, for instance, wrote that the signs’ content “plainly relates to
42
broad issues of interest to society at large,” namely “the political and
moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our
Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the
43
Catholic clergy.” In terms of the context in which that speech occurred, Chief Justice Roberts found that the “signs, displayed on public land next to a public street, reflect the fact that the church finds
44
much to condemn in modern society.” In particular, the purposeful
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 1215.
Id.
Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59
(1985) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
146 (1983)).
Id. (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)).
Id.
Clay Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps: A Pliable Standard Mingles
With News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39, 70 (2012).
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216.
Id. at 1217.
Id.
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context of protesting at military funerals illustrated the public nature
of the speech “because Westboro believes that God is killing Ameri45
can soldiers as punishment for the Nation’s sinful policies.”
Although Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the majority’s decision in favor of the WBC was narrow and “limited by the particular
46
47
facts before us[,]” he closed with a very broad rhetorical flourish
about the importance of protecting hateful and hurtful speech:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of
both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts
before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a
Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful
48
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.

Snyder came more than two decades after the Supreme Court’s
49
1988 decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell. Falwell first constitutionalized IIED in speech-based cases involving matters of public
50
concern by requiring public officials and public figures to prove, in
addition to the common-law IIED elements, “that the publication
contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’
i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless dis51
regard as to whether or not it was true.” In doing so, the Court
ruled against public-figure plaintiff Jerry Falwell’s efforts to recover
for the emotional distress the reverend and Moral Majority leader
sustained due to an ad parody in Hustler suggesting he engaged in “a
52
drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.”
In Snyder, the Court went beyond the rule it created in Falwell.
Specifically, the majority suggested that even when an IIED plaintiff is
53
a private figure, as was Albert Snyder, the First Amendment does not
permit recovery for IIED damages when the speech involves an opin-

45
46
47

48
49
50

51
52
53

Id.
Id. at 1220.
One commentator has dubbed Chief Justice Roberts’ concluding words in Snyder “a
breathtaking piece of rhetoric.” Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Judging Pain, 31 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 233, 245 (2013).
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
The Court emphasized in Falwell that “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is the
recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on
matters of public interest and concern.” Id. at 50.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 48.
See Mark Strasser, Funeral Protests, Privacy, and the Constitution: What is Next After Phelps?,
61 AM. U. L. REV. 279, 299 (2011) (noting that plaintiff Albert Snyder “does not qualify as
a public figure” and adding that “Falwell is distinguishable from [Snyder] in that the former involved a public figure”).
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ion on a matter of public concern.54 The Snyder Court, as Professor
Cristina Carmody Tilley writes, “failed to apply even the minimally
tort-protective standard it had announced in Falwell, where the actual
55
malice test was imported to IIED claims.” In a nutshell, “the Court
concluded that the First Amendment trumped the IIED tort
claim . . . because Westboro’s speech related to matters of import to
56
society at large.”
Why did the Court take these First Amendment-protective actions
in Falwell and Snyder? In both cases, it was particularly concerned
about providing a constitutional check against the subjectivity of the
common-law IIED element that requires a plaintiff to prove a defendant’s conduct (or speech, as in the cases here) is extreme and
57
outrageous. In Falwell, for instance, the Court reasoned:
“Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability
on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their
dislike of a particular expression. An “outrageousness” standard thus
runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact
58
on the audience.

More than twenty years later, in Snyder, the Court criticized outrageousness as “a highly malleable standard” that creates “a risk [that]
is unacceptable” in terms of speech being punished simply because it
59
is offensive or insulting to the tastes and views of jurors. The Court
thus reasoned that the WBC’s speech on matters of public concern
was “entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment, and
that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picket60
ing was outrageous.”
54

55
56

57
58
59
60

As Professor Frederick Schauer summarizes the Court’s holding in Snyder,
the Supreme Court invalidated the $5 million damage award, primarily because
the picketing was related to a matter of public concern. Because of this, the Court
held, the First Amendment prevented Maryland from applying the common law of
intentional infliction of emotional distress to the conduct of Phelps and the
Westboro Baptist Church.
Frederick Schauer, Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1881, 1888 (2013);
see also Russomanno, supra note 10, at 171 (noting that “Snyder expands protection
from [IIED] to defendants whose speech is on matters of public concern, regardless
of the plaintiffs public/private status”).
Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV.
65, 74 (2012).
Douglas Behrens, Balancing Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims and First
Amendment Protections in Snyder v. Phelps, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 213, 221
(2013).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011).
Id.
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How, then, is outrageous conduct defined? The extreme-andoutrageous conduct or speech element of IIED sometimes is described by courts as conduct that is “atrocious and utterly intolerable
61
in a civilized society.” It also represents conduct that is “so extreme
62
as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community.” As the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma neatly summed it up in 2011, this element “requires the existence of conduct so extreme in degree as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and which is viewed as
63
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” and that,
“[i]n general, a defendant’s conduct must be such that an average
64
member of the community would exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” Whether
or not the conduct in question amounts to such “an extraordinary
transgression is a fact-specific inquiry, to be considered on a case-by65
case basis, based on the totality of the circumstances.”
Conversely, as the Supreme Court of Nebraska recently wrote in
paraphrasing the observations of the drafters of the Restatement (Se66
cond) of Torts, “[m]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities that result from living in society do
67
not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.” The Supreme Court of Kentucky added that “[i]t must be more than bad
68
manners[.]” The Supreme Court of Kansas, in turn, concisely synthesized what does and does not amount to extreme and outrageous
conduct, writing in 2010,
[c]onduct that rises to the level of tortious outrage must transcend a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and occasional acts and words
that are inconsiderate and unkind. The law will not intervene where
someone’s feelings merely are hurt. In order to provide a sufficient basis
for an action to recover for emotional distress, conduct must be outrageous to the point that it goes beyond the bounds of decency and is ut69
terly intolerable in a civilized society.

61
62
63
64
65
66

67
68
69

S.B. v. St. James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 93 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v.
Griner, 809 So. 2d 808, 810 (Ala. 2011)).
Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 486 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009).
Durham v. McDonald’s Rests. of Okla., Inc., 256 P.3d 64, 67 n.1 (Okla. 2011) (citing
Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241, 248 n.25 (Okla. 1996)).
Id. (quoting Computer Publ’ns, Inc. v. Welton, 49 P.3d 732, 735 (Okla. 2002).
House v. Hicks, 179 P.3d 730, 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (1965) (“The liability clearly does not
extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”).
Roth v. Wiese, 716 N.W.2d 419, 432 (Neb. 2006).
Childers v. Geile, 367 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Ky. 2012).
Valadez v. Emmis Comm., 229 P.3d 389, 394 (Kan. 2010).
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Despite such judicial efforts to clarify what constitutes extreme
and outrageous conduct, the determination of outrageousness is still
subjective. As this Author waggishly asserted elsewhere,
[i]f Kevin Pollak’s character in A Few Good Men, Lt. Sam Weinberg, was
correct when he said that a fence line is a big wall that separates the good
guys from the bad guys, then outrageousness in IIED represents the most
shoddy variety of fence line: Its porousness and permeability prevent
70
predicting whether certain speech is actionable.

Procedurally, it is first up to a judge to determine if the conduct
or speech in question can possibly be considered extreme and outra71
geous. If a judge finds that it can be, then it is up to the jury to de72
cide whether, in fact, it is extreme and outrageous.
In summary, after Snyder, there is now a direct tension between
the constitutional interest in safeguarding expression affecting matters of public concern and the common-law tort interest in protecting
citizens against extreme and outrageous behavior. A finding of the
former, constitutional element by a court or jury is designed to keep
in check a simultaneous finding of the latter, common-law element.
Put more bluntly, the strain today is between speech about matters of
public concern and speech that is outrageous. How is that friction
playing out after Snyder? As the four post-Snyder cases described in
Part II indicate, both concepts—public concern and outrageousness—have so much elasticity that the current state of the law is
bound to produce inconsistent results and, in turn, shoddy doctrinal
development.
This probably is not surprising. As Professor David Ardia wrote in
the aftermath of Snyder, “much work remains to be done in formulating a consistent approach to divining this line” between speech about
73
matters of public and private concern. And in reference to the
Snyder dichotomy between public concern and private matters, Professor Steven Heyman adds that, in some cases, “the use of these abstract categories is simply too crude a tool to allow for a thoughtful
74
consideration of the values at stake.”
70
71

72
73
74

Clay Calvert, Tort Transformation in the Cultural Quicksand of Language and Values, 39 LITIG.
30, 34 (2013).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 66, at § 46 cmt. h (“It is for the court to
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery . . . .”).
See Hunt v. Delaware, 69 A.3d 360, 367 (Del. 2013) (“If reasonable minds may differ, the
question of whether the conduct is extreme and outrageous is for the jury.”).
David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 75
(2013).
Steven J. Heyman, To Drink the Cup of Fury: Funeral Picketing, Public Discourse, and the First
Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 101, 126 (2012).
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Of course, courts today are under no obligation to rip Snyder from
its rather quirky factual moorings and extend its public concern/private concern dichotomy to other IIED scenarios. That is because, as noted above, the Snyder majority wrote that its decision was
75
narrowly confined to the facts of the case. In fact, Professor Deana
Pollard Sacks argued in 2012 that Snyder is “specifically limited to its
76
extraordinary facts.” Additionally, courts could well interpret the
concept of public concern narrowly, so as to apply it only to opinions
and viewpoints—not to factual assertions—relevant to public debate
about issues affecting a democratic society, such as those on gay
rights and sexual abuse by the clergy in Snyder.
With this in mind, the Article now turns to an analysis of four postSnyder, media-defendant cases that illustrate the continuing elusiveness and ambiguousness of both public concern and outrageous
conduct.
II. PUBLIC CONCERN AND OUTRAGEOUS SPEECH: TESTING THE LEGAL
BOUNDARIES AFTER SNYDER IN A QUARTET OF MEDIA-DEFENDANT IIED
CASES
Each of the four cases examined below involves an IIED claim
filed against a media defendant and based upon the publication of
allegedly outrageous speech, rather than supposedly outrageous
newsgathering methods.77 The cases are analyzed in chronological
order, starting with the most recent and proceeding to the oldest.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps was cited by either the media defendants and/or the courts in all four cases.

75
76
77

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Deana Pollard Sacks, Constitutionalized Negligence, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2012).
Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against news media organizations may
be premised upon how the news or information in question was gathered, as compared to
how it was reported. See, e.g., Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 383
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[Plaintiff’s] principal claims survive, for . . . a reasonable jury could find
that NBC crossed the line from responsible journalism to irresponsible and reckless intrusion into law enforcement. . . . NBC purportedly instigated and then placed itself
squarely in the middle of a police operation, pushing the police to engage in tactics that
were unnecessary and unwise, solely to generate more dramatic footage for a television
show.”); KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the manner in which a never-broadcast
interview was conducted by a television news reporter with three minors, who were home
alone, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct). Such claims based upon allegedly
outrageous newsgathering methods are beyond the scope of this Article.
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The cases were chosen, in part, because they cut across a wide
and, arguably, controversial variety of topics that test the boundaries
of public concern and outrageousness, namely:
(1) the live television broadcast of a suicide that was later witnessed by the plaintiffs—the decedent’s three minor children—
78
on the Internet;
(2) the admittedly false publication by a well-known and gossipprone tabloid of a trio of stories regarding the death and re79
mains of Natalee Holloway;
(3) the Internet-posting of parts of a hidden-camera sex tape of a
well-known professional wrestler, Terry Gene Bollea, better
80
known as Hulk Hogan; and
(4) the broadcast of a woman’s arrest and involuntary appearance
81
on a reality television program called Female Forces.
82

A. Rodriguez v. Fox News Network LLC

Fast-forward approximately two-and-a-half years after Snyder to August 2013 and the defendant’s motion to dismiss (MTD) the IIED
83
claim in Rodriguez v. Fox News Network LLC. The commanding rhetorical dicta with which Chief Justice Roberts memorably closed his
Snyder opinion—the verbiage regarding the power of speech and the
84
need to protect even hurtful expression —finds itself quoted early in
85
the Rodriguez MTD. Snyder, in fact, is cited at multiple points in the
motion for the following propositions, each of which addresses matters of public concern:
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

85

Infra Part II.A.
Infra Part II.B.
Infra Part II.C.
Infra Part II.D.
Rodriguez Minute Entry, supra note 22.
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Rodriguez v. News Corp., No. CV2013-008467
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss].
This refers to the Court’s statement:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy
and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a
different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we
do not stifle public debate.
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 3.
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• “statements about issues of public concern that do not contain
provably false statements of fact – like the ones here – are abso86
lutely privileged under the First Amendment[;]”
• “as a matter of well-settled First Amendment and common law,
Fox cannot be held liable for emotional distress caused by news
87
coverage of an issue of public concern[;]”
• “a plaintiff cannot recover for emotional distress stemming
from statements addressing an issue of public concern without
demonstrating that the speech is false, or some other form of
88
unprotected expression[;]” and
• “the First Amendment’s long-settled protections for speech
about public officials and public figures apply with equal force
to speech on issues of public concern in the context of cases alleg89
ing emotional distress.”
What then, with this heavy reliance upon Snyder, was the alleged
issue of public concern in Rodriguez? Did it relate to national security,
foreign or domestic terrorism, same-sex marriage, credit-card data
breaches, the national debt, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, or the job Barack Obama is doing as President? Or did it
pertain, as was the scenario in Snyder, to issues such as American tolerance of homosexuality and sexual abuse by members of the clergy?
No, it related to none of the above. In fact, the speech that gave
rise to the IIED claim in Rodriguez was a fleeting, long-distance image
that was televised live to a national audience on Fox News Channel’s
90
Studio B with Shepard Smith on September 28, 2012. It was the picture
of JoDon Romero committing suicide in the Arizona desert after a
high-speed chase that concluded when Romero pulled off from In91
terstate 10, abandoned his car and ran from it. All totaled, about

86
87
88
89
90

91

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
See Complaint at 2–4, Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC, No. CV2013-008467, (Ariz.
Super. Ct. June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Rodriguez Complaint], available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/06/13/EditorialOpinion/Graphics/fox-car-chase-suicide-complaint.pdf (detailing the facts of the case).
Id. at 3–4.
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1.8 million viewers “witnessed the death from their couches.”92 Only
three people, however, who saw it later on the Internet, would provide the impetus for the Rodriguez lawsuit.
93

“That didn’t belong on TV.”

Shepard Smith, in apologizing with those words to his viewing audience shortly after airing Romero’s suicide, may be morally and ethically correct that Romero’s death was inappropriate for television.
That, however, is a far different matter from whether Fox News
should be held legally accountable to Romero’s children under the
IIED tort.
The Rodriguez complaint, which was filed on behalf of the three
minor sons of JoDon Romero, contended the trio, who were at school
when the death aired live on Fox News Channel, saw it later that day
at home after finding “a clip of the Fox News broadcast on
94
YouTube.” In a nutshell, the complaint’s IIED cause of action asserted that Fox’s decision to air the suicide live constituted extreme
and outrageous conduct or speech that ultimately caused the minors
95
severe emotional distress.
Fox News, unsurprisingly, framed the issues of public concern in
96
its motion to dismiss as “public safety and law enforcement,” not
Romero’s on-air suicide. In other words, the defendants focused on
the police chase of Romero and the danger it posed to the public,
not the suicide that transpired after the vehicular chase ended. Citing Snyder, Fox asserted that “a live news program that informed the
public about an ongoing police pursuit of an armed and ‘extremely
dangerous’ suspect cannot form the basis of a claim for emotional
distress where the Complaint fails to allege the Newscast was false in
97
any way.”
On January 30, 2014, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge
John Rea, immediately after hearing oral argument, ruled from the
98
bench in favor of Fox News and dismissed the IIED claim. Among
92
93

94
95
96
97
98

Don Kaplan et al., Fox News Horror, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2012, at 4.
Brian Stelter, Fox Regrets Suicide Shown Live, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at A16 (quoting
Shepard Smith’s on-air comment after his program aired the suicide of JoDon Romero)
(emphasis added).
Rodriguez Complaint, supra note 90, at 4.
Id. at 6.
Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 6.
Id. at 8.
See E-mail from Joel B. Robbins, Esq., Robbins & Curtin, PLLC, to author (Jan. 31, 2014,
11:19 EST) (on file with author) (stating that the judge “ruled from the bench that the
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other reasons that can be heard from an audio recording of the hearing, Judge Rea: a) cited First Amendment concerns; b) found the
events were newsworthy and did not stop being newsworthy simply
because they culminated in a suicide; and c) held that Fox’s actions
were not extreme and outrageous, as required under the basic ele99
ments of IIED.
Fox News’s successful and frequent use of Snyder in its Rodriguez
100
motion to dismiss initially suggests that both Professors Jaffe and
101
Lidsky, who are quoted at the start of this Article, may be correct in
predicting the long-term, pro-defendant impact of Snyder on IIED
claims brought by private figures. The Rodriguez IIED claim also was
plagued by the question of causation, with Fox News emphasizing in
its motion to dismiss that the children did not watch the Fox News
102
broadcast of the suicide but, rather, saw it only later on YouTube.
As Fox asserted, “whatever emotional injuries they suffered were not a
direct and proximate result of the Newscast. Rather (and rather candidly), they were the result of (a) their father’s lawless conduct, and
(b) their mother’s apparent failure to control their access to the In103
ternet.”
Regardless of these seemingly clear flaws with the plaintiffs’ IIED
case, the underlying facts of Rodriguez make it an excellent vehicle for
considering the metes and bounds of public concern and outrageousness post Snyder. Furthermore, the case is still very much alive,
as the plaintiffs’ attorney, Joel Robbins, vowed to appeal it, asserting
104
that “[t]he First Amendment has some limitations.”
Consider, for example, the factors of “context” and “content”
spelled out by the Snyder majority in determining whether speech is a
105
matter of public concern. The speech at issue in Snyder occurred in

99
100
101
102

103
104

105

motion to dismiss was granted for [F]irst [A]mendment reasons, and that [his] IIED
failed because it wasn’t outrageous”).
Audio Recording of Motion to Dismiss Hearing, Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC,
Jan. 30, 2014 (on file with author).
Jaffe, supra note 9.
Lidsky, supra note 11.
See Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 10 (“The Complaint concedes that
Plaintiff’s children were in school and did not watch the Fox Newscast. Instead, they
learned of the incident at school and later that day watched a video clip of the incident
on YouTube.”).
Id.
Jacques Billeaud, Arizona Judge Tosses Suit Against Fox News Network, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2014, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/14/ariz-judge-tossessuit-against-fox-news-network/ (quoting Robbins).
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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the context of what the Court called “public debate,”106 specifically in107
108
volving “picketing” and “protest” in the geographical context of a
109
“traditional public forum” and during which the WBC “convey[ed]
110
its views” on content relating “to broad issues of interest to society
111
at large.”
Was, one might reasonably wonder, Fox News really engaged in
112
“public debate” —a key phrase used by Chief Justice Roberts in the
same Snyder dicta quoted approvingly by Fox News in Rodriguez—
when it aired the suicide? What “public debate,” one might query,
would be stifled were tort liability to be imposed in Rodriguez? Fox
News and Shepard Smith were not, in fact, debating the pros and
cons of high-speed police car chases on public freeways. Furthermore, they were not debating anything to do with suicide.
Instead, Fox was merely casting a camera on the world to capture
facts as they unfolded in unscripted fashion, with Shepard Smith playing the role of narrator. Unlike the members of the WBC, Fox News
was not expressing its viewpoints or opinions on any broad issues of
interest to society at large, but simply was seizing images of events as
they transpired in real-time fashion and merely providing a verbal
narration to supplement the transmission of instantaneous images.
Snyder, in brief, dealt with the expression of viewpoints and opinions in the form of words. Rodriguez deals largely with the expression
of facts in the form of images. Although Judge Rea failed to make
this distinction between assertions of opinion (Snyder) and assertions
of fact (Rodriguez), the federal magistrate in Holloway v. American Me113
dia, Inc. (described in the next Subpart) recognized this fundamental difference in 2013, and it played a pivotal part in the outcome of
that case, which allowed an IIED claim to continue in the face of a
114
Snyder-based, public-concern defense.
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

113
114

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
Id. at 1218.
Id.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1216.
This refers to the Court’s statement:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy
and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a
different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we
do not stifle public debate.
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (emphasis added).
947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (recognizing the difference between assertions of opinion and assertions of fact).
See infra Part II.B.
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Furthermore, in Snyder, the Supreme Court wrote that “the issues
[the WBC members] highlight—the political and moral conduct of
the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are
115
It is a long stretch to claim that a car
matters of public import.”
chase of a lone, previously unknown individual is equivalent to such
matters of public import in Snyder, let alone whether the image of the
suicide of a single individual in the Arizona desert is a matter of public import. What this illustrates, of course, is the vastly expansive and
almost unrestrained nature of the concept of public concern upon
which the Snyder majority rested its decision. Even if one assumes
that a car chase is matter of public concern because innocent people
might be injured by it and because it illustrates law enforcement officials performing their important and dangerous public duties, one
might reasonably wonder whether this matter of public concern terminates when the car chase itself ends and the suspect pulls out a gun
to shoot himself.
If Snyder’s determination that private figures must pay an emotional price for speech about matters of public concern represents, as
Professor Ronald Krotoszynski aptly puts it, “a major displacement of
traditional state tort law to accommodate . . . debate about public af116
fairs[,]” then Snyder does not necessarily extend to a factual situation (as opposed to a situation involving the expression of opinions)
where the plaintiffs are minors. This would be a far different scenario from Snyder’s facts, because Snyder involved an adult-father plaintiff.
Additionally, in Rodriguez, the factual images of the suicide of the
children’s father did not affect any debate about public affairs.
Is live coverage of car chases by law enforcement personnel truly a
matter of public concern? Assuming for the sake of argument that it
is a matter of public concern, then is continuing, post-chase coverage—
after the car chase ends, after the vehicle is no longer on a public
road or highway where it might collide with other vehicles and when
its driver is no longer near any other members of the public so as to
endanger their safety—a matter of public concern? And, going yet
another step further, is an image of a desperate man—a man who
almost certainly will not escape capture because law enforcement
personnel are on the scene—killing himself a matter of public concern akin to the viewpoints that animated Snyder?

115
116

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217.
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 902 (2013).
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All of these are questions that could easily be put to a jury if, in
accord with Chief Justice John Roberts’ own words in Snyder, the
117
FurCourt’s opinion in that case is limited by its particular facts.
thermore, unlike the public-figure plaintiff in Falwell, the plaintiffs in
Rodriguez—three minors—are private figures, rendering a Falwellbased defense distinguishable and impossible to raise in Rodriguez.
The rule from Falwell thus does not apply, and all that a court like
that in Rodriguez then is left with is Snyder and the choice of whether
to stretch Snyder beyond its factual confines to a very different context. Judge Rea chose to extend it, and his decision illustrates the
vast elasticity of public concern in IIED cases involving private-figure
plaintiffs.
The flipside of the public concern question is whether, under the
common-law IIED elements, the conduct of Fox News was extreme
118
and outrageous. The answer likely depends upon how one parses
and splices the conduct. Airing a car chase on a newscast is likely not
extreme and outrageous conduct; in fact, it seems routine today, ra119
ther than beyond the bounds of decency in a civilized society. Conversely, airing a suicide live on national television might well be considered extreme and outrageous conduct today, especially if, as Part
III suggests, it is reasonably foreseeable that resulting suicide images
will quickly migrate to the Internet where they likely will exist in perpetuity.
Another way to parse the extreme-and-outrageous conduct issue—
one that an inventive plaintiff’s attorney might assert—is that it was
extreme and outrageous for Fox not to properly use a tape-delay
mechanism that would have allowed it to stop coverage prior to the
suicide. When a human being fails to timely push the button in order to dump out of the live coverage, as apparently happened in Ro120
driguez, and a suicide of no newsworthy value then is shown live, why
121
If, as
not impose tort liability to deter it from happening again?

117
118
119
120

121

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text (describing and defining the concept of
extreme and outrageous conduct as that term is used in the IIED tort).
See infra Part IV.
See Al Tompkins, Will TV’s Long Love Affair With Car Chases Come to a Screeching Halt as Fox
Broadcasts Suicide Live?, POYNTER (Sept. 30, 2012, 7:46 AM), http://www.poynter.org/
latest-news/als-morning-meeting/189989/will-tvs-long-love-affair-with-car-chases-come-toa-screeching-halt-as-fox-broadcasts-suicide-live (“Executive Vice President for News Michael Clemente tried to explain how it happened. He called it a ‘severe human error.’
True enough. The network put the live feed on a five-second delay, but even that precaution depends on humans hitting a button to ‘dump’ out of the broadcast”).
Professor Andrew Popper writes that:
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First Amendment expert Randall P. Bezanson asserts, “a central pur122
pose of tort law is to deter and shape harmful behavior,” then imposing monetary damages for such shoddy conduct would likely lead
in the future to better training among employees about how to
properly operate a tape-delay mechanism, so as not to allow it to
happen again. A little legal deterrent—or, when parsed more dangerously from the typical media defendant’s parade-of-horribles perspective, a little chilling effect—might not always be such a bad thing,
especially if it improves the skills of those tasked with television news
coverage. Al Tompkins of the Poynter Institute writes that Fox News
also had other options: “Not to air the chase at all. Or Fox could
have recorded the footage and waited until the chase ended to air
123
portions of it.”
Ultimately, Fox News Channel’s heavy reliance in its MTD on
124
Snyder and its focus on matters of public concern seemed to pay off
handsomely before Judge Rea, who dismissed the case immediately
125
Whether this holds up on the nowafter hearing oral argument.
pending appeal in Rodriguez remains to be seen.
126

B. Holloway v. American Media, Inc.

In May 2013, a federal district court in Alabama refused to dismiss
an IIED claim filed against the publisher of the National Enquirer by
Elizabeth Ann Holloway, mother of Natalee Holloway, who disap127
peared in 2005 in Aruba. Natalee Holloway’s disappearance penetrated deep into popular culture and public consciousness, even
spawning a highly watched made-for-television movie on the Lifetime
128
Channel and causing Nancy Grace’s TV career to soar. But it was

122
123
124
125
126
127
128

the tort system is fully defensible as a primary deterrent mechanism. It is not a
perfect system. Not every case deters. In the aggregate, however, the civil justice
system provides a powerful and continuous messaging device that positively affects
the safety and efficiency of goods and services.
Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 185 (2011/12).
Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth in Public
Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90 IOWA L. REV. 887, 892 (2005).
Tompkins, supra note 120.
See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (describing the portions of the Rodriguez
Motion To Dismiss that reference the concept of public concern and Snyder).
See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the dismissal of the case).
947 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala. 2013).
See id. at 1271 (“The motion to dismiss and for partial summary judgment is due to be
DENIED as to the plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
See Jonathan Storm, Holloway Movie and Mother’s Show are Inexcusable, PHILA. INQUIRER, May
7, 2011, at D1 (criticizing the treatment of the Natalee Holloway disappearance by the
Lifetime movie and noting that Nancy Grace’s “career soared on the wings of Natalee’s
disappearance”); see also Tom Jicha, Grace Before Dinner, SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2010,
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the National Enquirer’s publication of at least three articles that
spawned an IIED claim by Natalee’s mother, who alleged the stories
were knowingly false and intended to cause her to suffer severe emo129
Specifically, and as explained by the court, the oftional distress.
fending articles
described a map that purported to show where Natalee’s body was located, a “secret graveyard” where Natalee had been “buried alive,” and other
details about her “murder” and the treatment of her “corpse,” including
that it had been secreted temporarily in a coffin with another corpse be130
fore being moved to a final location.

Elizabeth Ann Holloway, represented by high-profile, plaintiff131
defamation attorney L. Lin Wood, claimed “the stories, headlines,
and photographs published in those three articles caused her to suf132
The National Enquirer and its owner,
fer severe emotional stress.”
American Media, countered, among other things, that they were “not
liable to plaintiff on her tort claims because the published materials
are ‘of public concern’ and thus are protected by the First Amend133
ment” and because “the conduct at issue is not sufficiently ‘outrageous’
to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress un134
der Alabama law.”
Both concepts at the center of this Article—the First Amendment
interest in protecting speech about matters of public concern and the
common law IIED requirement of proving outrageousness—thus
were squarely before the court in Holloway. The National Enquirer and
American Media, represented by the prominent media-defense firm
135
of Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, cited Snyder. Specifically, they

129
130
131

132
133
134
135

available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-09-12/entertainment/fl-arts-nancygrace-091210-20100912_1_nancy-grace-cnn-headline-news-casey-anthony (asserting that
Nancy Grace “almost single-handedly made Casey Anthony and Natalee Holloway into national cause celebres”).
Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
Id.
Wood was “lead civil attorney for the late Richard Jewell in matters arising out of reporting about Mr. Jewell in connection with the 1996 bombing of Centennial Olympic Park in
Atlanta[,]” “attorney for Dr. Phil McGraw in connection with false and defamatory articles published by Newsweek, the Daily Beast and the National Enquirer[,]” and “lead civil attorney for Howard K. Stern in the prosecution and defense of defamation claims arising
out of the death of Anna Nicole Smith.” L. Lin Wood, WOOD, HERNACKI & EVANS, LLC,
http://www.whetriallaw.com/Attorneys/L-Lin-Wood.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
The firm’s “attorneys have been involved in most of the leading media cases in the past
two decades involving defamation, product disparagement, invasion of privacy, and rights
of publicity,” and Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz “has been engaged at one time or another by virtually every major media company and has been appointed by the leading
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argued that the presence of the former concept (public concern)
would trump the existence of the latter (outrageousness). They asserted in sweeping fashion that, “regardless of the falsity or outrageousness
of speech, it is protected by the First Amendment if it involves a mat136
The National Enquirer went so far as to
ter ‘of public concern.’”
concede falsity for purposes of its motion to dismiss the IIED cause of
137
The next
action, thus arguably pushing Snyder to its outer limits.
two Subparts separately analyze how the court in Holloway addressed
the Snyder/public-concern argument and the question of outrageousness.
1. Snyder and Matters of Public Concern in Holloway
Rebuffing the media defendants on their Snyder-based defense,
U.S. Magistrate T. Michael Putnam decisively put the brakes on an
expansive interpretation of Snyder, while nonetheless acknowledging
the National Enquirer’s underlying speech about Natalee Holloway’s
138
Putnam initially reined in
disappearance was of public concern.
Snyder by suggesting that Snyder’s holding is limited to cases involving
opinions, not factual assertions, on matters of public concern. He wrote
that
like the “ad parody” in Falwell, the speech at issue in Snyder did not involve asserted “facts,” at least in the sense that a reasonable person could
understand the offending speech to assert ascertainably “false” statements. The expressions “God Hates Fags” and “You’re Going to Hell”
and “Thank God for IEDS” are, at best, opinions, not factual state139
ments.

In stark contrast, in Holloway it was “undisputed that the articles at issue purported to describe facts concerning Natalee Holloway’s disap140
pearance.”
141
Second, Magistrate Putnam seized on Chief Justice Roberts’ observation in Snyder that the WBC members honestly believed their

136
137
138

139
140

media insurance companies to defend scores of smaller media businesses around the
country in libel, privacy, and publicity cases.” Defamation, Privacy & Publicity, Practice Areas,
LEVINE SULLIVAN KOCH & SCHULZ, LLP, http://www.lskslaw.com/practice-areas/
defamation-privacy-publicity (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1262 (“Defendants have definitively stated that, for purposes of their motion, they
accept the plaintiff’s allegations that the articles were false.”).
Magistrate Putnam opined that “[t]here is little question that the disappearance of Natalee Holloway, which dominated news coverage for many weeks, if not years, and which
involved the safety of travel abroad and called up the worst fears of parents, was a matter
of ‘concern to the community.’” Id. at 1261 n.10.
Id. at 1261 n.11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1261 n.9.
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viewpoints. “Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the
subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of
Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that Westboro’s
picketing did not represent its ‘honestly believed’ views on public is142
sues[,]” wrote Roberts. Magistrate Putnam interpreted this to stand
for the proposition that “the First Amendment protection described
143
in Snyder does not extend to speech that is not ‘honestly’ believed.”
Third, Magistrate Putnam opined that Snyder’s First Amendment
shield does not apply, even when the underlying topic is about a matter of public concern, if the speech “is used as a weapon simply to
144
mount a personal attack against someone over a private matter.”
Putnam drew support for this conclusion from Roberts’ twin observations in Snyder that:
• “We are not concerned in this case that Westboro’s speech on
public matters was in any way contrived to insulate speech on a
145
private matter from liability.”
• “There was no pre-existing relationship or conflict between
Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro’s speech on
public matters was intended to mask an attack on Snyder over a
146
private matter.”
Using these statements in Snyder to distinguish it from the case before him, Magistrate Putnam noted that Elizabeth Ann Holloway,
“unlike [the plaintiff in] Snyder, ha[d] alleged that she had a preexisting relationship with the defendants and that the newspaper ar147
ticles at issue were ‘intended’ to cause her distress.” Ultimately,
Magistrate Putnam concluded that “Snyder does not definitively extend First Amendment protection to the speech at issue, because
plaintiff has alleged that the statements made were not ‘honestly believed,’ and were motivated by some desire to attack her or cause her
148
pain.” In his view, “Snyder implies that knowingly false speech motivated by a specific intent to cause emotional harm to a particular per141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

See id. at 1261 (“The Court in Snyder noted, however, that there was no allegation that the
church members were not representing their ‘honestly believed’ views on public issues.”).
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011).
Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
Id.
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217.
Id.
Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
Id. at 1262 (emphasis added).
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son may also fall outside First Amendment protection.”149 Magistrate
Putnam concluded that the First Amendment did not bar Holloway’s
“claim that publication of knowingly false information about her
daughter’s disappearance constituted outrageous conduct where it
was published with the intent and expectation that it would cause se150
vere emotional distress to her.”
In a nutshell, Holloway indicates that even if the underlying subject
151
matter is about a matter of public concern, Snyder will not apply if
1) the speech involves factual assertions, rather than expressions of
opinions and viewpoints; 2) the factual assertions are false and the
defendant does not honestly believe them to be true; and 3) the publication of the false factual assertions is motivated by a desire and intent to attack or cause pain to the plaintiff. This interpretation, of
course, represents the view of only one federal jurist thus far.
Magistrate Putnam clearly rejected the defendants’ Snyder-based
and extremely sweeping contention that they were “not liable to
plaintiff on her tort claims because the published materials are ‘of
152
public concern’ and thus are protected by the First Amendment[.]”
The defendants essentially swung hard and deep for a legal home run
when “they accept[ed] the plaintiff’s allegations that the articles were
153
false” and then cited Snyder as supporting the bright-line proposition “that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides a
bar to state-law tort claims that arise from speech on matters ‘of pub154
lic concern.’” In the end, however, they struck out.
Magistrate Putnam’s decision is perhaps better understood
through the lens of Falwell. That initially is the case because both
Falwell and Holloway involved IIED claims filed by public-figure plain155
Second, Falwell held that such plaintiffs must prove, in additiffs.
tion to the basic common-law IIED elements, “that the publication
contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’
i. e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard

149
150
151

152
153
154
155

Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1264–65.
In Holloway, the underlying subject matter was “the disappearance of Natalee Holloway,
which dominated news coverage for many weeks, if not years, and which involved the
safety of travel abroad and called up the worst fears of parents.” Id. at 1261 n.10.
Id. at 1254.
Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1262 (N.D. Ala. 2013).
Id. at 1261.
See id. at 1261 n.8 (observing that “the parties in this case do not dispute that Elizabeth
Holloway, who sought publicity about the disappearance of her daughter and appeared
frequently on television after Natalee disappeared . . . is a public figure”). See supra notes
49–52 (noting that Falwell was a public figure).
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as to whether or not it was true.”156 In Holloway, it was undisputed that
157
158
Magistrate
the offending articles involved facts that were false.
Putnam’s interpretation of Snyder then takes Elizabeth Holloway’s
case home through the final step of Falwell, as he wrote that “Snyder
implies that knowingly false speech motivated by a specific intent to cause
emotional harm to a particular person may also fall outside First
159
Amendment protection.”
2. Outrageousness in Holloway
The National Enquirer and its owner asserted that the conduct of
publishing the articles was not extreme and outrageous and, thus,
Elizabeth Ann Holloway’s IIED claim failed a basic element of the
160
tort. Magistrate Putnam observed that under Alabama law, the extreme-and-outrageous element requires atrocious and utterly intolerable conduct that goes beyond the bounds of decency in a civilized
society such that IIED is available as a remedy “only under the most
161
egregious circumstances.”
Importantly, Putnam acknowledged the case was one of first impression in the Yellowhammer State, writing that “[t]here are no reported Alabama cases where the underlying conduct allegedly causing the extreme emotional distress was a mere publication of
162
information.” Yet, despite this precedential uncertainty, he also was
“unwilling to find that published words alone can never be the basis
163
for an outrage claim.”
In particular, he framed Elizabeth Ann Holloway’s IIED claim as
arising “from graphic descriptions of the treatment of her daughter’s
164
corpse.” Thus, while the Rodriguez case described in Part II.A deals
with visual images of death captured at the moment it happens, Holloway pivots on word-based descriptions of the remains of a presumptively already-dead individual. Magistrate Putnam reasoned that
[b]ecause “family burials” is one of the limited types of cases in which
[IIED] has been applied, this court is unwilling to state as a matter of law
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (emphasis added).
Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 n.9 (“It is also undisputed that the articles at issue purported to describe facts[.]”).
See id. at 1262 (noting that the “[d]efendants . . . definitively stated that, for purposes of
their motion, they accept[ed] the plaintiff’s allegations that the articles were false”).
Id. at 1263 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1265–67 (outlining the defendants’ arguments).
Id. at 1266.
Id.
Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2013).
Id.
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that falsely reporting gruesome details of a daughter’s death, coupled
with the intent to cause emotional distress, could never support a claim
165
for outrage.

Ultimately, Holloway settled in 2013 before it could reach the U.S.
166
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The negative precedent
for media defendants established by Magistrate Putnam in IIED cases,
including his narrow reading of Snyder, thus is confined to the Northern District of Alabama. Regardless of the amount of money forked
out in the confidential settlement, the media defendants were able to
control the precedential damage in Holloway by settling.
Whether other courts adopt or distinguish Magistrate Putnam’s
reasoning on Snyder and its impact on IIED claims remains to be
seen.
167

C. Bollea v. Gawker Media, Inc.

Terry Gene Bollea, better known as Hulk Hogan, filed a complaint in federal court in 2012 against the operators of the Gawker
168
As part of that lawsuit,
website for, among other theories, IIED.
Bollea sought a preliminary injunction ordering Gawker to take down
“excerpts from the Hulk Hogan sex tape that were posted on the
www.Gawker.com website on or about October 4, 2012 and to enjoin
Defendants from posting, publishing or releasing any portions or
content of the sex tape to the public, including that or any other
169
According to Bollea, the tape was made without his
website.”
knowledge about a half-dozen years earlier when he had sex with a
170
woman who was not his wife.
In deciding whether to grant the injunction, U.S. District Judge
James D. Whittemore quoted Snyder’s proclamation, which itself was
drawn from the libel case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build171
ers, Inc., that “speech on matters of public concern . . . is at the
172
Judge Whittemore
heart of the First Amendment’s protection.”

165
166

167
168
169
170
171
172

Id.
See E-mail from L. Lin Wood, Esq., Wood, Hernacki & Evans, LLC, to author (Jan. 30,
2014, 15:54 EST) (on file with author) (“The case settled shortly after the motion to dismiss was denied.”).
No. 8:12–CV–02348–T–27TBM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162711 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2012).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *2 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *4.
472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bollea, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162711, at *6 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
1215 (2011)).
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furthermore quoted173 Snyder’s disjunctive, two-part definition of pub174
lic concern, under which such speech is anything fairly considered
to relate to any matter of political, social or other concern to the
175
community or that relates to a subject of legitimate news interest.
Applying Snyder’s definition of public concern to the facts of the
case, Judge Whittemore reasoned,
[the] [p]laintiff’s public persona, including the publicity he and his family derived from a television reality show detailing their personal life, his
own book describing an affair he had during his marriage, prior reports
by other parties of the existence and content of the Video, and Plaintiff’s
own public discussion of issues relating to his marriage, sex life, and the
Video all demonstrate that the Video is a subject of general interest and
176
concern to the community.

Judge Whittemore thus concluded that, at least at the preliminary injunction stage, the decision regarding whether to post excerpts from
177
the sex tape “is appropriately left to [the] editorial discretion” of
Gawker. Because he was only considering whether an injunction
should be issued, Judge Whittemore did not address the substantive
elements of IIED and, in particular, the question of whether posting
parts of the video constituted extreme and outrageous conduct.
Nonetheless, Bollea indicates that Snyder’s definition of public concern can be stretched quite far beyond the narrow context of hoisting
printed signs—ones emblazoned with written words of both political
and religious protest regarding American tolerance of homosexuality
and sexual abuse by the clergy—to the salacious and sordid visualimagery world of fading-glory celebrity sex tapes.
Significantly, Judge Whittemore’s opinion did not end the tale of
the titillating tape. In January 2014, a Florida appellate court in
178
Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea —Bollea dropped his federal claim after
losing before Judge Whittemore and then chose to test his luck in the
Florida state court system—held that injunctive relief stopping Gawker from posting excerpts of the video and a narrative of it amounted
179
to an unconstitutional prior restraint. In doing so, the Florida appellate court quoted Snyder for the proposition that speech about
173

174
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at *7 (“Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it
is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value
and concern to the public.” (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011)).
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (setting forth the two-part test).
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (providing the two-part test).
Bollea, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162711, at *8.
Id. at *9.
129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 1198.
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matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment.180
It then had little trouble holding that it was “clear that as a result of
the public controversy surrounding the affair and the Sex Tape, exacerbated in part by Mr. Bollea himself, the report and the related
181
video excerpts address matters of public concern.” The unanimous
three-judge panel added that the fact that the tape dealt with sexual
content did not, in and of itself, remove it from the realm of public
182
concern. The only limitation noted by the Florida appellate court
was that “[d]espite Mr. Bollea’s public persona, we do not suggest
183
that every aspect of his private life is a subject of public concern.”
Ultimately, in ruling in favor of Gawker, the court reasoned that,
the written report and video excerpts are linked to a matter of public
concern—Mr. Bollea’s extramarital affair and the video evidence of
such—as there was ongoing public discussion about the affair and the
Sex Tape, including by Mr. Bollea himself. Therefore, Mr. Bollea failed
to meet the heavy burden to overcome the presumption that the temporary injunction is invalid as an unconstitutional prior restraint under the
184
First Amendment.

The bottom line is that while the U.S. Supreme Court in Snyder
embraced the concept of public concern as a touchstone in an IIED
case involving weighty, gravitas-laden issues such as government policies tolerating homosexuality and sexual abuse by the clergy, Rodriguez stretched it to include televised car chases, and both Bollea cases
found that it encompassed celebrity sex tapes and the sexual affairs of
celebrities. Neither Rodriguez nor Bollea did anything to suggest that
public concern constitutes a narrow category of expression; rather, it
is vast and sweeping. Bollea thus clearly falls in line with the prediction of Professor Lidsky that Snyder would prove a boon for media de185
fendants when litigating tort cases.
186

D. Best v. Berard

Of the four post-Snyder and media-defendant IIED cases addressed
in this Part, Best represents what is arguably the most obvious, clearcut case of the speech in question being about a matter of public
180
181
182

183
184
185
186

Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1201 (footnote omitted).
Id. (“[T]he mere fact that the publication contains arguably inappropriate and otherwise
sexually explicit content does not remove it from the realm of legitimate public interest.”).
Id.
Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
776 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
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concern and the defendants’ conduct, in turn, not being extreme
and outrageous. This comes despite the fact that Best involves con187
tent that some people might classify as “infotainment.”
The case centered on plaintiff Eran Best’s claim that her involun188
tary depiction on the reality television show Female Forces —a depiction that showed her, among other things, taking a field sobriety test,
being arrested for driving on a suspended license and talking about
189
how she “likes Coach purses, bags, and shoes” —“caused her severe
190
emotional distress.” The episode featuring Best’s arrest, which occurred in Naperville, Illinois, also included a police officer stating,
“Do I feel sorry for [Best]? No. Pretty little blond girl, 25 years old,
191
driving a Jaguar-yeah, that’s Naperville.” Additionally, the segment
included footage, taken inside the police car where Best was held,
that focused “on a dashboard computer, on which information about
Best—including her date of birth, height, weight, driver’s license
number, and brief descriptions of previous arrests and traffic stops—
192
[was] displayed.” The segment ran more than two dozen times on
193
the Biography Channel.
194
Although the case was decided on March 3, 2011 —just one day
after the Supreme Court decided Snyder—U.S. District Judge Matthew
F. Kennelly nonetheless cited both Snyder’s observation that the con195
tours of public concern “are not well defined” and its disjunctive
definition of public concern, namely:
[S]peech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is,
196
a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.

In determining whether the Female Forces segment featuring Eran
Best’s arrest fell within this definition, Judge Kennelly initially ob187

188

189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

See Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 797 (2009)
(discussing “infotainment” and defining it as “[t]he entertainment format of news reporting”).
The show “is an unscripted ‘reality’ television series that follows female police officers as
they perform their duties and interact with members of the public.” Best, 776 F. Supp. 2d
at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See Best v. Berard, 776 F. Supp. 2d 752, 755 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[The episode] has been rebroadcast thirty times on that channel since December 14, 2008.”).
See id. at 752 (noting the case was both decided and filed on March 3, 2011).
Id. at 757 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (additional citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. (quoting Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at, 1216) (emphasis added).
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served that “courts have repeatedly held that information about ar197
rests rises to the level of public concern.” Finding “no contrary au198
thority” to this classification of arrests as matters of public concern,
the judge concluded that the defendants’ “depiction of Best’s arrest
and its surrounding circumstances—including the computer screen
shots giving information about prior arrests or citations—conveyed
truthful information on matters of public concern protected by the
199
First Amendment.”
The fact that some people might consider Female Forces to be more
entertainment than news, Judge Kennelly wrote, “does not alter the
200
201
He cited favorably here the U.S. SuFirst Amendment analysis.”
202
preme Court’s 1948 ruling in Winters v. New York. There, the Court
reasoned that “[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining
is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s
203
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”
Furthermore, the fact that the underlying alleged criminal activity
leading to Best’s arrest was merely driving with a suspended license
rather than something more serious, such as murder or assault, made
204
no difference to Judge Kennelly. He observed that newspapers routinely print information about many types of arrests in their blot205
ters, and he found “no authority to support drawing this sort of dis206
tinction in determining the First Amendment’s application”
between serious and minor criminal offenses. He thus concluded
that Female Forces “depicted, in Best’s case, an arrest on criminal
charges and facts concerning prior arrests or citations. These are legitimate matters of public concern, even if Best’s encounters with the
police involved conduct that was arguably toward the lower end of
197
198
199
200
201

202
203

204

205
206

Id.
Id. at 758.
See Best v. Berard, 776 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
Id.
Id. (“‘[T]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of th[e] basic right’ of a free press.” (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948))).
333 U.S. 507 (1948).
Id. at 510. The final sentence in this quotation foreshadows the Supreme Court’s dicta
more than two decades later that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
See Best, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (“[Best’s actions] are legitimate matters of public concern,
even if Best’s encounters with the police involved conduct that was arguably toward the
lower end of the spectrum of criminality.”).
See id. (“The Court notes that it is relatively commonplace for newspapers to reprint ‘police blotter’-type information involving arrests.”)
Id.
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the spectrum of criminality.”207 Judge Kennelly therefore found that
208
The judge
the First Amendment precluded Best’s IIED theory.
never addressed whether the actions in question were extreme and
outrageous within the meaning of IIED.
In summary, the concept of public concern post-Snyder was sufficiently expansive in Rodriguez, Bollea and Best to shield the media defendants from liability for IIED based upon the publication of allegedly outrageous speech by members of the media. On the other
hand, in Holloway, the court readily acknowledged that the disap209
pearance of Natalee Holloway was also a matter of public concern,
but Magistrate Putnam nonetheless refused to stretch Snyder’s holding to protect the National Enquirer.
The next two Parts circle back to Rodriguez to consider aspects of
the IIED claim therein that reach beyond the confines of the public
concern issue—namely, increasing legal worry about the publication
of images of death in the Internet era and the reality that televised
car chases are, in fact, well known to end in the broadcast of such images.
III. GROWING CONCERNS OVER IMAGES OF DEATH: THE INTERNET AS A
GAME CHANGER AND HOW IT COULD AFFECT IIED CASES LIKE
RODRIGUEZ IN THE FUTURE
This Part, as well as Part IV, returns to explore in greater detail
aspects of the case of Rodriguez v. Fox News Network, LLC that went unaddressed in Part II.A above. Specifically, this Part illustrates how
growing legal squeamishness toward death-scene images, at least in
the realms of public records laws and privacy rights, might—if not in
Rodriguez—eventually spill over into the realm of IIED. Part IV then
returns to media coverage of car chases, but this time focusing on the
reasonable foreseeability of televised death as one result of such reportage.
Rodriguez arose at a time when both lawmakers and courts across
the country seemed particularly concerned about the emotional
harm that might be caused to family members by viewing graphic im207
208

209

Id.
While Judge Kennelly’s analysis of the public concern issue came within the context of
considering an Illinois statutory theory—dubbed “Count 2”—alleging that the use of
Best’s identity for commercial purposes without her written consent violated her rights,
he nonetheless wrote that “[t]he First Amendment analysis that the Court has applied to
Count 2 likewise warrants a similar outcome for Best’s claims for invasion of privacy
(count 3) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (count 4).” Id. at 759.
Supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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ages of the death or dead bodies of their relatives. In the wake of the
killings at Sandy Hook Elementary School, for instance, Connecticut
in 2013 amended its public records law to exempt from disclosure
any record “consisting of a photograph, film, video or digital or other
visual image depicting the victim of a homicide, to the extent that
such record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the victim or the victim’s
210
A dozen years earlier, following the
surviving family members.”
death of NASCAR driver Dale Earnhardt, Florida carved out from its
public records law an exemption for “[a] photograph or video or au211
Addidio recording of an autopsy held by a medical examiner.”
tionally, Georgia recently created a crime-scene exemption in its
open records laws for images depicting a “deceased person in a state
212
The
of dismemberment, decapitation, or similar mutilation . . . .”
exemption was adopted after the murder of Meredith Emerson, who
213
was killed in 2008 while hiking in the Georgia mountains.
The worry about the release of images in these and other instances seems largely driven by the fact that the death images might, precisely as they did in Rodriguez, end up on the Internet. As one commentator notes, “family members are left devastated by the
unwarranted invasion to privacy that occurs when the intimate visual
depictions of a loved one’s death are published to the Internet, and
214
made available for mass viewing.”
The worry today has moved beyond the realm of open records
215
laws described above and into the terrain of constitutional law. In
216
Marsh v. County of San Diego, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in 2012 recognized “[t]he long-standing tradition of respect-

210
211
212

213

214
215
216

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(27) (2013).
FLA. STAT. § 406.135(2) (2012).
The provision provides, in relevant part, that:
Crime scene photographs and video recordings, including photographs and video
recordings created or produced by a state or local agency or by a perpetrator or
suspect at a crime scene, which depict or describe a deceased person in a state of
dismemberment, decapitation, or similar mutilation including, without limitation,
where the deceased person’s genitalia are exposed, shall not be subject to disclosure . . . .
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-27(e)(1) (2014).
See Brenda Goodman, Killing of a Young Hiker Puts North Georgia on Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2008, at A12 (discussing Meredith Emerson’s death and the impact of her death on
her community).
Christine M. Emery, Note, Relational Privacy—A Right to Grieve in the Information Age: Halting the Digital Dissemination of Death-Scene Images, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 765, 771 (2011).
See supra text accompanying notes 210–13.
680 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2012).
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ing family members’ privacy in death images.”217 Alex Kozinski, Chief
Judge of the Ninth Circuit, wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel
in Marsh:
Few things are more personal than the graphic details of a close family
member’s tragic death. Images of the body usually reveal a great deal
about the manner of death and the decedent’s suffering during his final
moments—all matters of private grief not generally shared with the world
218
at large.

In Marsh, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal appellate
court to recognize a substantive due process familial privacy right to
219
control public dissemination of a family member’s death images.
Chief Judge Kozinski wrote that “the Constitution protects a parent’s
right to control the physical remains, memory and images of a deceased child against unwarranted public exploitation by the govern220
ment.”
The plaintiff-mother in Marsh was concerned that graphic autopsy
images of her son that were leaked to the news media by a former
221
government employee might end up on the Internet. Chief Judge
Kozinski wrote that her “fear [was] not unreasonable given the viral
nature of the Internet, where she might easily stumble upon photographs of her dead son on news websites, blogs or social media web222
sites.”
In Rodriguez, the images of death also ended up on the Internet,
223
where they were viewed by the deceased’s sons. The major difference, of course, is that Rodriguez is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, but
rather a civil tort action not involving a government agency or official. Yet courts have recognized that the public dissemination of either death images or remains of loved ones may constitute valid
224
claims for IIED by their relatives in extreme circumstances.
217
218
219

220
221

222
223
224

Id. at 1154.
Id.
See id. (“So far as we are aware, then, this is the first case to consider whether the common
law right to non-interference with a family’s remembrance of a decedent is so ingrained
in our traditions that it is constitutionally protected [by substantive due process].”).
Id.
See id. at 1155 (noting that Marsh claimed to have suffered severe emotional distress due
to the fear that she would come across her son’s autopsy photos displayed on the Internet).
Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012).
Rodriguez Complaint, supra note 90, at 4.
See, e.g., Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 366–67 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010), modified and reh’g denied, No. 07CC07817, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 253 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010) (centering on the public distribution, by members of the California Highway
Patrol, of images of a nearly decapitated young woman who was killed in a car accident);
Armstrong v. H & C Comm., Inc., 575 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (centering on
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In recognizing a constitutional right of familial control over images of death, the Ninth Circuit in Marsh cited and built upon the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2004 opinion in National Archives & Records Admin225
istration v. Favish. In Favish, the Court recognized a familial privacy
right over death-scene images within the context of Exemption 7(C)
226
But Justice
of the federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).
Anthony Kennedy, in writing for the Court, went beyond FOIA and
found that the “well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a
family’s control over the body and death images of the deceased has
227
Kennedy added that
long been recognized at common law.”
“[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their
228
own.”
This Author calls Favish the “key decision in the area of familial
229
Professors Samuel Terilli
privacy rights over death-scene images.”
and Sigman Splichal argue that Favish is but one example of increasingly “deep societal concerns regarding the privacy rights and feelings of family members—concerns heightened by technology (the In230
ternet and digital reproduction, for example).”
Some of those concerns are embodied in state statutes restricting
public access to autopsy images. As Professor Jeffrey R. Boles wrote in
2012, “[l]egislatures and courts have accorded greater privacy protection to autopsy and death scene photographs than to any other type
of death record. Numerous state statutes explicitly render these pho231
tographs inaccessible to the public.” Professor Boles, in accord with

225
226

227
228
229
230

231

the broadcast, by a television station during a newscast, of the image of the skull of a
young girl, and allowing a claim for the tort of outrage to proceed where the television
station both staged a close-up shot of the girl’s skull and then aired footage the same day
of a memorial service being held for her).
541 U.S. 157 (2004) (holding that families have a statutory right to privacy regarding the
public release of information about a loved one’s death).
Id. at 171 (opining that “the personal privacy protected by Exemption 7(C) extends to
family members who object to the disclosure of graphic details surrounding their relative’s death . . . .”).
Id. at 168.
Id.
Clay Calvert, Dying for Privacy: Pitting Public Access Against Familial Interests in the Era of the
Internet, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 18, 22–23 (2010).
Samuel A. Terilli & Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-Scene Photographs:
Relational Privacy, Public Records and Avoidable Collisions, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 341
(2005).
Jeffrey R. Boles, Documenting Death: Public Access to Government Death Records and Attendant
Privacy Concerns, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 285 (2012).
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the reasoning of Professors Terilli and Splichal, asserts that “[t]he
special danger inherent in a photograph’s release is its unseemly,
sensationalistic mass reproduction, particularly through the Inter232
net.” Professors Boles, Terilli, and Splichal are not alone in recognizing the emotionally destructive power of the Internet when it
233
comes to the posting of images of death.
How might this legal trend of increasing concern about the emotional harm caused by images of death in the Internet era be of importance in Rodriguez and other IIED cases based upon the media’s
publication of death images? Rather than granting a motion to dismiss, some courts might allow cases filed by relatives of the deceased
to proceed to a jury on the question of whether or not airing a live
suicide constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of
the news media, in a decade where it is clearly foreseeable that such
images might go viral on the Internet.
Arizona Revised Statute § 12-752, for instance, governs motions to
234
dismiss in the Grand Canyon State, and it applied in Rodriguez. As
interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court in 2012, dismissal under
this section is appropriate “only if ‘as a matter of law [] plaintiffs
would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts
235
Furthermore, at the MTD stage, “courts
susceptible of proof.’”
must assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and in236
dulge all reasonable inferences from those facts . . . .” The court, at
the MTD stage, “does not resolve factual disputes between the parties
237
on an undeveloped record.”
Although Judge Rea dismissed Rodriguez, there may come a point
when other judges, perhaps disillusioned with the voyeuristic and
sensational tendencies of today’s news media, finally decide to let the
public—namely, juries—sort out whether live coverage of death and
images of the dead is extreme and outrageous conduct. Judicial concern about relational privacy rights in cases like Marsh and Favish
232
233

234
235
236
237

Id. at 286.
See, e.g., Catherine Leibowitz, Note, “A Right to be Spared Unhappiness”: Images of Death and
The Expansion of the Relational Right of Privacy, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 347, 375
(2013) (“While the Internet has greatly fostered the public’s ability to communicate, it
has also, unfortunately, proven how people can abuse the Internet for depraved reasons[,]” and arguing that “[i]n order to deter private individuals from disseminating images of death at the expense of the deceased’s relatives, state courts should allow damage
actions against private individuals.”)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752 (2007).
Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 867 (Ariz. 2012) (quoting Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
State Dep’t of Ins., 954 P.2d 580, 582 (Ariz. 1998)).
Id.
Id. at 874.
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might flow over into the realm of IIED. For now, however, Marsh and
Favish remain confined as cases about restricting access to images of
death possessed by government officials and agencies, rather than extending tort liability to the publication of such images. Perhaps a little bit more caution and care by the likes of Fox News Channel the
next time it airs a car chase—from the effective use of tape-delay
mechanisms to not even showing a chase until immediately after it
238
ends, so that any images of death can be edited out —will prevent
legal concerns about access to death images from migrating to IIED
claims like Rodriguez.
IV. THE FORESEEABLE SPECTACLE OF TELEVISED DEATH: ROLLING THE
LEGAL DICE WITH LIFE AND DEATH
In its motion to dismiss in Rodriguez, Fox News asserted that its
coverage of the car chase of JoDon Romero “ended in an act of vio239
lence that could not have been foreseen.” It added that “[l]ive television coverage of newsworthy events is inherently fast-paced and of240
ten unpredictable[.]”
In fact, however, television news organizations are arguably well
aware that such broadcasts might end in a violent death. More than a
dozen years ago—back in January 2000—Broadcasting and Cable magazine began a story with these two paragraphs:
The unpredictability of a police car chase has again been demonstrated for viewers, as a Phoenix audience several days ago watched as police shot a suspect to death after a wild pursuit, leaving pundits and public questioning the propriety of the chase-in-progress’ emergence in an
increasingly infotainment medium.
With at least one earlier suicide and another fatal shooting by police
broadcast live from TV helicopters—both in Southern California, where
the car chase has become a television staple—death cannot be denied as a
241
possible outcome.

In 1998, MSNBC aired live the suicide of Daniel Jones on a Los
Angeles freeway after he “unfurled a banner protesting health
242
maintenance organizations. . . .” CNN, in contrast, anticipated the
243
Was it foreseeable that
possible violent death and did not air it.
238
239
240
241
242
243

See supra note 120 and accompanying text (describing such options).
Rodriguez Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83, at 2.
Id. at 10.
Dan Trigoboff, Shooting Raises Coverage Issues, BROAD. & CABLE, Jan. 31, 2000, at 13 (emphasis added).
Peter Johnson, MSNBC to Add Delay After Showing Suicide, USA TODAY, May 4, 1998, at 3D.
Id. (stating that CNN, though monitoring Jones’ actions, chose not to air the live footage).
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Jones’ death might be aired live? “It was bound to happen. . . . Any
time you cover something live and un-edited you’re taking a risk[,]”
stated Warren Cereghino, an executive producer for the owner of TV
244
More succinctly, Los
station KCOP, which aired live the suicide.
Angeles Times television critic Howard Rosenberg wrote in the aftermath of the Jones suicide: “Live coverage of a volatile situation is the
245
equivalent of playing Russian roulette.”
In 1999, Southern California TV viewers watched a man named
Michael Thayer get shot to death after he “came out of his car and
246
was killed in a hail of police bullets . . . .” Indeed, as journalist Eric
Nusbaum wrote in the aftermath of the events giving rise to the complaint in Rodriguez, “the promise of a grisly or dramatic ending is what
247
Televised death on the news
gives the police pursuit its power.”
continues today, with KTLA-TV Channel 5 in Los Angeles showing
live in December 2013 Brian Newt Beaird being shot to death by
members of the Los Angeles Police Department after a pursuit when
248
he crashed his car and tried to stagger away.
Why is all of this relevant for the IIED tort in cases like Rodriguez?
Because it illustrates that news organizations such as the Fox News
Channel clearly should be aware of the chance that live coverage of a
car chase like that involving JoDon Romero will end in a violent
death. Under the elements of IIED, it is not a requirement that the
defendant must intend to cause the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress. Rather, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
wrote in 2013, it is sufficient that the defendant acted with a “reckless
249
This has
disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress[.]”
been interpreted broadly to mean giving little or no thought to the
250
potential consequences of one’s actions. As Professor John Kircher

244

245
246
247

248

249
250

Patrick Rogers, L.A.’s TV News: Pulling Away from Live Shots?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June
1998, available at http://ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=2318 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Howard Rosenberg, The Russian Roulette of Live News Coverage, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1998,
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/may/02/entertainment/ca-45412.
Dan Trigoboff, Another California Highway Shootout, BROAD. & CABLE, Dec. 6, 1999, at 56.
Eric Nusbaum, ‘Horribly Wrong’—Fox’s Live Suicide and the Thrill of the Police Chase, DAILY
BEAST, Sept. 30, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/30/horriblywrong-fox-s-live-suicide-and-the-thrill-of-the-police-chase.html.
See Kate Mather & Richard Winton, LAPD Chief: ‘Very Thorough’ Inquiry into Fatal Shooting
Underway, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-in-lapdinquiry-fatal-shooting-20131217-story.html (describing the event).
Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
See Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (interpreting
the meaning of “reckless disregard”).
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notes, “[r]ecklessness could be characterized as engaging in conduct
251
The comments to
with conscious disregard of its consequences.”
the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggest that reckless disregard means
conduct engaged in with “deliberate disregard of a high degree of
252
probability that the emotional distress will follow.”
As Rodriguez now works its way through the appellate court process
in Arizona, it will be interesting to see if such points about the foreseeability and probability of death following car chases are raised by
the attorney for the plaintiffs and, in turn, if they carry the day with
the appellate court.
CONCLUSION
Writing in 2012, Professor Mark Strasser fittingly characterized the
U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of public concern in Snyder v. Phelps
253
as “a very forgiving standard” that “would include a whole host of
254
The post-Snyder IIED cases of Rodriguez, Bollea and
subjects . . . .”
Best examined in this Article clearly prove Professor Strasser’s point,
as well as the predictions of First Amendment scholars such as Joseph
Russomanno, who speculated that “[a]fter Snyder, intentional infliction of emotional distress is weaker—and perhaps disabled—in
claims stemming from speech. First Amendment protection is now
stronger. The circumstances under which an intentional infliction
255
claim could prevail have narrowed.”
From a live-televised car chase and suicide involving a previously
unknown individual to an old hidden-camera sex tape of a wellknown celebrity posted on the Internet to a reality television show
depicting the arrest of a heretofore private individual for a minor
crime, all three IIED cases were held to involve matters of public concern. These subjects are all far, far removed from the underlying
facts of Snyder. The decisions in Rodriguez, Bollea and Best thus are
clear First Amendment victories for media defendants in IIED cases
involving both private (Rodriguez and Best) and public (Bollea) figures.
Although Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in Snyder that the ma256
jority’s holding was both “narrow” and “limited by the particular
251
252
253
254
255
256

John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV.
789, 799 (2007).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 66, at § 46 cmt. i.
Mark Strasser, What’s It to You: The First Amendment and Matters of Public Concern, 77 MO. L.
REV. 1083, 1117 (2012).
Id. at 1118.
Russomanno, supra note 10, at 171.
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
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facts before us[,]”257 not one of the courts in Rodriguez, Bollea or Best
cited that language or otherwise felt constrained by it. All three
courts, instead, metaphorically waved it off and extended Snyder’s
public-concern focus to very different facts. Snyder emphasized that
the content, context, and form of speech were three factors to be
258
weighed in the public concern determination. The courts in Rodriguez, Bollea and Best had no trouble finding public concern when the
speech in question was very different from Snyder across all three variables.
All five cases examined here, including Snyder, were determined
by courts to involve matters of public concern. Yet, as the table immediately below illustrates, they factually cut across the trio of publicconcern variables—content, context and form—in very different
ways.

While Snyder did not involve a media defendant, the cases of Rodriguez, Bollea and Best all did. Why is this important? Because judicial deployment of a very soft and nebulous concept like public concern in IIED-based, media-defendant cases carries the very real
possibility of the constitutional public-concern defense from Snyder
eventually swallowing the IIED tort. In particular, when a media defendant is involved, additional First Amendment concerns about

257
258

Id.
Id. at 1216.
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freedom of the press—not simply freedom of speech—come into play
that were not present in Snyder. Those concerns arguably may lead to
259
even greater judicial deference paid toward IIED media defendants
when interpreting the meaning of the already vague notion of public
concern. This is consistent with how courts often are similarly concerned with providing deference to media defendants when considering newsworthiness and matters of public concern in the public dis260
In brief, judicial deference, when
closure of private facts tort.
coupled with the squishy concept of public concern, constitutes a
highly favorable formula for media defendants in IIED cases after
Snyder.
Although Holloway also involved a matter of public concern—the
261
disappearance of, and search for, Natalee Holloway —Magistrate
Putnam’s decision is the only one of the four cases examined here to
draw a line on the scope of Snyder. As noted earlier, Magistrate Putnam held that Snyder will not protect the news media, even when a
matter of public concern clearly is involved, if the speech consists of
false factual assertions that are published with the motivation, desire,
262
and intent to attack or cause pain to an IIED plaintiff.
While public concern in Snyder represents a constitutional requirement grafted onto the common law IIED tort to provide a check
on the subjective and equally pliable element of extreme and outrageous conduct, it may well be that the two concepts are simply inversely correlated. Specifically, the more the speech in question is
about a matter of public concern, the less likely it is for publication of
that speech to be deemed extreme and outrageous. For instance, if
one considers car chases by law enforcement officials to be matters of
public concern, then it is much harder to argue that the news media’s decision to air them live—from high-speed start through suicid259

260

261
262

See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84
IOWA L. REV. 941, 943 (1999) (stating that deference amounts to “a type of judicial selfrestraint”).
See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998) (“An analysis measuring
newsworthiness of facts about an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an
event of public interest by their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter incorporates
considerable deference to reporters and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press . . . .”); see also Danielle Keats Citron,
Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1829 (2010) (“Free speech concerns
impact the efficacy of privacy torts as well. Courts dismiss public disclosure claims where
information addresses a newsworthy matter, in other words, one of public concern. They
often defer to the media’s judgment, all but guaranteeing the demise of plaintiffs’
claims.”) (citations omitted).
See Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1261 n.10 (N.D. Ala. 2013).
Id. at 1254, 1261–62.
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al finish—is outrageous. Similarly, if one considers the sex lives of celebrities to be matters of public concern, then it is difficult to simultaneously find that the publication of excerpts of videotapes depicting those same celebrities having sex is extreme and outrageous. In
this sense, then, initial judicial resolution of the constitutional publicconcern question largely dictates how courts will later resolve the
common law question of whether publication of the speech was extreme and outrageous.
How might future courts—perhaps plaintiff-sympathetic ones
concerned with the possibility that Snyder’s emphasis on speech about
matters of public concern might eventually swallow up most of the
IIED tort in speech-publication cases—attempt to limit Snyder’s reach?
The starting point, of course, would be to seize on Chief Justice Roberts’ unambiguous statement that “the reach of our opinion here is
263
limited by the particular facts before us.”
From there, a court might do as Magistrate Putnam did in Holloway and suggest that Snyder is simply a case about protecting opinions
and viewpoints on matters of public concern, not about protecting fac264
In this perspective, Snyder was concerned only with
tual assertions.
shielding speakers from tort liability for expressing outrageously offensive ideas and viewpoints in the context of public debate. Thus,
265
the Snyder Court found it important to quote the late Justice William Brennan’s statement in the flag-burning case of Texas v. John266
son that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
267
disagreeable.”
Had Judge Rea embraced this narrow view in Rodriguez, it would
have gutted the Snyder-grounded public concern defense since Rodriguez dealt with facts, not viewpoints. Falwell, in turn, would not have
helped Fox News because the Rodriguez plaintiffs are private individuals, namely minors. Without Snyder and Falwell, then, Rodriguez would
need to be decided simply upon the four basic common law elements
of IIED. Setting aside the plaintiffs’ major problem with proving cau268
sation of harm described in the case earlier, the malleable element
of extreme-and-outrageous conduct would likely have played a pivotal
263
264
265
266
267
268

Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
Holloway, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 & nn.9 & 11.
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 102–103.
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role in the outcome of Rodriguez. The doctrinal issue, then, is whether it is better to counter a malleable common law element (outrageous speech/conduct) with an equally pliable constitutional one
(public concern). As this Article has demonstrated, public concern is
an immensely expansive concept, but one that stretches in favor of
First Amendment interests.
Conversely, it should be noted that even if the federal and state
courts in Bollea had applied this narrow “viewpoints-only, not-facts”
interpretation of Snyder to the substance of the IIED claim in that
case, Gawker still would have prevailed under a relatively straightforward application of Falwell. Under Falwell, the public-figure plaintiff,
Terry Gene Bollea, would have needed to prove that Gawker con269
veyed a false factual assertion with actual malice. The videotape at
issue, and accompanying narrative of it, were true factual assertions—
thus ending the IIED inquiry and protecting Gawker’s First Amendment rights of free speech and press. Parsed differently, the court’s
focus in Bollea on Snyder’s emphasis on matters of public concern may
have been relevant at the preliminary injunction stage, but it would
have been irrelevant for the motion to dismiss the IIED claim because
Falwell already provides sufficient protection.
Such a Falwell-based successful outcome for the media defendant
in Bollea actually raises another related point. Given Snyder’s unique
facts and Chief Justice Roberts’ statements about the narrowness of its
holding, media defense attorneys might be wise not to trot it out too
often and, instead, only use it when Falwell will not protect them. In
other words, there may be a breaking point where defendants essentially overuse and abuse Snyder by trying to factually analogize the
matters of public concern within it to those in every case that comes
down the pike. Eventually, the factual analogies may become too
farfetched that a judge simply does not buy them and refuses to find
a matter of public concern at stake.
A second and much more controversial way to limit Snyder’s reach
would be to factually confine it to cases involving non-media defendants, as was the scenario with the members of the Westboro Baptist
Church. This solution seems particularly untenable, however, in light
of decisions such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s
270
There, the
January 2014 ruling in Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox.
269

270

See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“[P]ublic figures and public
officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice[.]’”).
740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Ninth Circuit held, in the context of a defamation case and considering whether to apply constitutional fault-based protections to a blogger, that “a First Amendment distinction between the institutional
271
press and other speakers is unworkable[.]”
This comports directly with the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n to delineate between corpo272
rate and non-corporate speakers. Justice Anthony Kennedy opined
for the majority in Citizens United that the First Amendment forbids
“restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing
273
speech by some but not others” and that “[s]peech restrictions
based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means
274
Justice Kennedy added that “[t]he First
to control content.”
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow
275
Considered in the aggregate, these statements emfrom each.”
brace the proposition that speaker equality is a key First Amendment
value. Any court that would attempt to limit Snyder to non-media defendant cases thus would be cutting decidedly against the grain of
constitutional precedent.
The bottom line, of course, is that only three years have elapsed
since Snyder, and it will take many more IIED cases to fully sort out
the metes and bounds of Snyder and its lasting impact on the tort.
But as the majority of the cases examined here indicates, Snyder is—at
least for now and at least for media defendants—proving to be, much
like the Court’s defamation decision in New York Times Co. v. Sulli276
277
van, another occasion for dancing in the streets. The dancing only stops —and then only thus far in one federal jurisdiction in Alabama—when defendants, as they did in Holloway, sweepingly claim
that Snyder protects even knowingly false factual assertions on public
issues made with the intent to harm the plaintiff.

271
272
273
274
275
276
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Id. at 1291.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Id. at 898.
Id. at 899.
Id.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment”, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (1964) (noting that philosopher-educator
Alexander Meiklejohn hailed Sullivan as “an occasion for dancing in the streets.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

